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Boeing:
Atlas V with 
CST-100
SpaceX:
Falcon with 
Dragon 2
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• Commercial Crew Program Purpose
• Crew Safety Boundaries
• How we achieve Human Rating
• CoFR Strategy
• Shared Assurance Model
AgendaAgenda
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AgendaPurpose/Background
• CCP Mission Statement: The purpose of the CCP is to facilitate the development of a U.S. 
commercial crew space transportation capability with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost 
effective access to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS).
• Background/Assumptions:
• CCP manages a human rated spaceflight services based contract
• Commercial Provider owns the design (Not NASA)
• NASA does not own the hardware, software, or systems used to fabricate, assemble, test, 
launch, or recover crew to and from ISS
• Certification of the Commercial Transportation System (CTS) is the responsibility of the 
commercial partner
• NASA Commercial Crew Program must provide a certification package (CoFR) to NASA 
Administrator indicating system is safe enough for NASA crew members to ride
• NASA Technical Authorities must concur with Certification and Risk Acceptance
• Resources to execute and manage CCP and meet agency expectations for Human Rated 
Program are limited therefore using Risk Based Approach to identify where, who, and how 
much so that crew safety is maintained
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AgendaCrew Safety – CCP Scope and Boundaries
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AgendaHuman Rating Requirements Flow down for CCP
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AgendaNASA Process for Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR) 
SMSR
(Safety and Mission
Success Review)
FRR
(Flight Readiness Review)
CoFR
Certification
Surveillance
Accepted 
Risk
Certification
Surveillance
+ Accepted Risk
CoFR
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AgendaAssessment of Changes in Certification Endorsement Role 
CoFR
Certification
Surveillance
Accepted 
Risk
SMSR
FRR
• While some areas of S&MA role have 
changed, S&MA has appropriate influence 
and authority
• S&MA TA is voting member of Safety 
Technical Review Board, Technical Review 
Board and Program Control Board
• CCP S&MA Office and TA have good working 
relationship with Program
• CCP S&MA Office works closely with S&MA 
TA
• Alternate path through KSC S&MA director if 
needed
• S&MA TA has direct path to OSMA if 
concerns are not heeded
Certification Strategy Acceptable to S&MA
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AgendaAssessment of Changes in Surveillance Scope and Roles 
Surveillance Strategy Acceptable to S&MA
CoFR
Certification
Surveillance
Accepted 
Risk
SMSR
FRR
• No concerns about reduced surveillance if:
• Maintain good communication between CCP offices
• Setup and maintenance of Surveillance database
• Adequate S&MA resources to support intra-program 
assurance role
• CCP S&MA Office and TA have good working 
relationship with Program
• CCP S&MA Office works closely with S&MA TA
• Alternate path through KSC S&MA director if needed
• S&MA TA has direct path to OSMA if concerns are 
not heeded
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AgendaAssessment of Accepted Risk Strategy
Risk Acceptance Strategy Acceptable to S&MA
CoFR
Certification
Surveillance
Accepted 
Risk
SMSR
FRR
• Tracking and risk analysis modelled on LSP 
approach (Document KTI-3643)
• Information gathered from insight efforts
• Anomalies have progressive attention
• Evaluation → Watch Item → Risk
• Issues will arise from both Certification and 
mission-to-mission phases
• Design/mission/environment changes
• Non-conformances in build process
• Test failures from similar systems or other 
fleet vehicles
• Acceptance test results
• Use SMEs and VSEs to evaluate risk level
• Can supplement with independent 
assessments, NESC, etc.
• Increasing management notification as risk 
increases
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AgendaShared Assurance
Shared Assurance: A process that uses risk based decision making to 
identify and allocate resources based on level of risk while minimizing or 
eliminating organizational overlap and redundancy
Key Concepts:
• Technical Breadth remains unchanged
• Technical depth changes 
• Level of penetration determined by Risk Assessment
• NASA Insight is an essential to  identify and develop understanding of risk
• Minimize Organizational Redundancy (limit multiple organizations overlap) – important 
to clearly define roles and responsibilities
• End goal is Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR)
• CoFR = Certification + Surveillance + Risk Acceptance
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CCP Shared Assurance – What is Different?
Next: How to get from Traditional to Shared Assurance Model
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CCP Shared Assurance - What are we giving up?
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Giving Up: Depth of Coverage for
Identified Low Risk Areas 
Insight Baseline for CCP/Engineering/H&M/S&MA 
Traditional Cert LOE
CCP Baseline LOE
S&MA 
Changes in High 
Priority Areas?
Breadth of coverage by system not changed
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Sub systems and areas of Technical Risk
ECLSS Structure Power GNC CMTCS Prop C&T IV&V
Non 
Conformances
Note:
The profile is 
expected to be 
unique for each 
provider and 
changing over 
time
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Safety and Hazard RBA/Shared Assurance Flow & 
Examples
Provider 
Certification 
Activity / 
Evidence
Risk Based 
Analysis 
Performed 
by Technical 
Team
Identifies 
NASA 
Surveillance 
Activities
Organization 
Performs 
Surveillance 
Activities
Results 
Documented 
in CCTS CDP
Adjusted based on Evidence
Identifies 
Best 
Surveillance 
Organization
Hazard Report 
Identifies Following
Controls:
RBA Results Surveillance
Activities
Organization Performance Documentation
Inspect for Sharp 
Edges and Burrs
Low Risk None N/A Nominal Trending / 
Nonconformance 
Monitoring
Reports as required
Perform Integrated 
Hardware/Software 
Testing of GN&C 
algorithm for 
docking with ISS
High Risk due to 
complexity and 
known sensitivity to 
algorithm tolerances
Witness and 
participation in 
testing.  Perform 
Independent 
verification of 
algorithm(s)
Engineering:
GN&C and IV&V
Performs on site 
visit to witness and 
participate in 
testing.
Activities 
documented in CCP
Surveillance 
Database, 
summarized for 
CCTS CDP
Ensure proper 
quality assurance 
process 
implemented by 
component supplier
Moderate Risk that
would makes NASA 
surveillance prudent
Process Audit S&MA:
Quality Assurance
Performs a process 
audit to ensure 
proper flowdown of 
QA requirements to 
hardware supplier.
Activities document 
in CCP Surveillance 
Database, 
summarized for 
CCTS CDP
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AgendaSummary
• CCP is applying and verifying to Human Rating requirements
• HEOMD-CSD-10001 Rev A
• CCP is using a Risk Based Assessment approach to identify the areas of high 
risk and focusing resources onto those areas
• This is a living process and where risk arises adjustments will be made appropriately
• CCP is using a Shared Assurance model to adequately cover the identified 
areas with the right resources minimizing overlap and redundancy
• S&MA will not review everything but everything will be reviewed by a US government 
employee with the right knowledge and skills
• CCP S&MA’s Prime Mission is Crew Safety
Purpose – “…with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost effective access 
to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS).”
15
2014
S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
2015 2016 2017
CCtCap Combined Milestone Summary
Major Reviews
CBR ISS
DCR
OFT 
FTRR
CFT 
DCR
CFT 
FTRR 
ORR CR
Ground 
Segment 
CDR
Phase II Safety
Review – Part B
Delta 
ICDR
QTV PRR
STA 
TRR
CCCS Act./Val. 
Test Cmplt
QTV 
IRR
FSW 
Demo.
MCC Int. 
Sims. SAR
QTV 
TRR
Int. Parachute 
System Drop 
Tests 1 & 2 
Comp.
OFT 
FOR
SM Hot Fire Launch 
Abort Test Cmplt
Spacecraft 
Servicing ORR
PAT 
Cmplt Flight 
Testing
Qualification & 
Verification
SpaceX Milestone.
Boeing Milestone
OFT 
CPWSR
CBR Delta 
CDR
Launch 
Site ORR
DCR ORR CR
Flight Test 
w/o Crew 
CR
Flight to ISS 
w/o Crew
(DM-1)
Launch 
Site ORR 
for Crew
FTRR Flight to ISS 
w/ Crew
(DM-2)
Initial Propulsion Module 
Testing Cmplt
Avionics Test 
Bed Activation
Docking System 
Qual Test Cmplt
Propulsive Land   & 
Landing Test Cmplt
ECLSS 
Integrated 
Test Cmplt
Parachute Qual 
Test Cmplt
Space Suit Qual 
Test Cmplt
Major Reviews
Flight 
Testing
Qualification & 
Verification
DM-1 
PQR
Phase II Safety 
Review –
STRB 
Readiness
Phase II Safety 
Review – STRB 
80%
OFT CFT
.
Required Milestone
CCtCap CMS-Official February 2, 2015
Data Source: Boeing FY15Q1 / SpaceX 
FY15Q1 
POC: Debbie Cole 321-867-0834 
